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Abstract
We discuss a model of an economic community consisting of N interacting agents.
The state of each agent at any time is characterized, in general, by a mixed strategy
profile drawn from a space of s pure strategies. The community evolves as agents
update their strategy profiles in response to payoffs received from other agents. The
evolution equation is a generalization of the replicator equation. We argue that when
N is sufficiently large and the payoff matrix elements satisfy suitable inequalities, the
community evolves to retain the full diversity of available strategies even as individual
agents specialize to pure strategies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the striking phenomena exhibited by a wide variety of complex adaptive systems
is that individual agents or components of the system evolve to perform highly specialized
tasks, and at the same time the system as a whole evolves towards a greater diversity in terms
of the kinds of individual agents or components it contains or the tasks that are performed in
it. Some examples of this include living systems which have evolved increasingly specialized
and diverse kinds of interacting protein molecules, ecologies which develop diverse species
with specialized traits, early human societies which evolve from a state where everyone
shares in a small number of chores to a state with many more activities performed largely
by specialists, and firms in an economic web that explore and occupy increasingly specialized
and diverse niches.
In this paper we study a mathematical model of economic communities that exhibits these
twin evolutionary phenomena of specialization and diversity. The system is a community of
N (say, human) agents. There are s strategies or activities each agent can perform labelled
by i ∈ S ≡ {1, 2, . . . , s}, and at the time t the agent α (α = 1, . . . , N) performs the activity
i with a probability pαi (t) (thus
∑s
i=1 p
α
i (t) = 1 ∀ α, t). The vector p
α(t) = (pα1 (t), . . . , p
α
s (t))
is called the mixed strategy profile of agent α at time t. If pαi (t) = δij for some j ∈ S then
the agent α is said to pursue the pure strategy j or to have ‘specialized’ in the strategy j at
time t. The set of vectors pα, α = 1, . . . , N constitute the basic degrees of freedom of the
model. The dynamics is defined by the equation
p˙αi (t) = p
α
i (t)

∑
β 6=α
∑
j
aijp
β
j (t)−
∑
β 6=α
∑
k,j
pαk (t)akjp
β
j (t)

 , 1 ≤ α ≤ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ s, (1.1)
which determines the rate of change of an individual pα in terms of the current mixed
strategy profiles of all the agents and the payoff matrix A = [[aij ]].
We motivate this model as follows: Agents interact with each other on a short time scale,
receive payoffs based on each other’s activity, and update their individual strategy profiles
on a longer time scale so as to increase their payoffs. As is usual in game theory, aij denotes
the payoff received by an agent pursuing a pure strategy i in a single interaction with an
agent pursuing the pure strategy j. Then the average payoff received by the agent α from the
rest of the community in the period t to t+∆t is proportional to ∆t
∑
β 6=α
∑
k,j p
α
k (t)akjp
β
j (t).
This assumes that every agent interacts equally often with all other agents and that there
is a separation of time scales: ∆t can be chosen long enough for there to be a statistically
sufficient number of interactions during the period, yet short enough that the change in the
strategy profiles during this period can be ignored in the computation of the average payoff.
If α had played the pure strategy i in this period, she would have received an average payoff
proportional to ∆t
∑
β 6=α
∑
j aijp
β
j (t). The agent α increments p
α
i by an amount proportional
to pαi as well as to the difference between the average payoff she would have got in this
interval if she had pursued a pure strategy i and the average payoff she actually received:
∆pαi = c∆tp
α
i [
∑
β 6=α
∑
j aijp
β
j (t)−
∑
β 6=α
∑
k,j p
α
k (t)akjp
β
j (t)], where c is a constant. Equation
(1.1) follows upon dividing by ∆t, taking the limit, and rescaling time by a factor c. By
construction, each agent makes a positive change in the weight of strategy i in her own
strategy profile if she perceives that the pure strategy i would give a higher payoff in the
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current environment than her current strategy profile, and a negative change if it were to
give a lower payoff.
Eq. (1.1) is nothing but the ‘multipopulation replicator equation’ discussed in [1] (and
references therein). There each α represents a population, and pαi represents the fraction
of individuals in the population α pursuing the strategy i. Since for us each α represents
an individual and not a population, we refer to dynamics specified by (1.1) as simply the
generalized replicator dynamics (GRD). By contrast the replicator dynamics (which we
hereafter refer to as the ‘pure replicator dynamics’ (PRD)) is given by (see [2])
x˙i(t) = xi(t)[
∑
j
aijxj(t)−
∑
k,j
xk(t)akjxj(t)], i = 1, . . . , s. (1.2)
This is a standard model in evolutionary biology describing the growth and decay of s species
under selection pressure with xi representing the fraction of the i
th species in the population.
PRD and its variants are also extensively studied in economics in game theory as models
for dynamical selection of equilibria (see, e.g., [3] [4]). Its generalizations have also been
studied in the context of the emergence of organizations in complex adaptive systems (see
[5] and references therein). For extensive accounts of more recent contributions to PRD and
further references, see the recent books [6,7].
We view GRD as a model of learning in a community of N interacting agents. The
agents are identical in that each is capable of pursuing the same set of strategies with the
same payoffs. This is a non-cooperative game in which the agents act selfishly (each is
concerned with increasing her own payoff without consideration of impact on others or the
community), and exhibit bounded rationality (no anticipation of others’ strategy, merely a
response to the current aggregate behaviour of others). There is no global organizing agency
at work, individual actions alone are responsible for the evolution of the system.
Nevertheless, we shall argue that the community as a whole seems to exhibit a kind of
global organization under certain circumstances. Individual agents tend to specialize, while
the community as a whole retains its diversity, i.e., each pure strategy is pursued by some
agent or the other. We attempt to find conditions on the parameters of the model (the size
N of the community and the s× s payoff matrix A) such that this behaviour occurs. While
most of the time we work with a strategy space of a fixed size (and refer to diversity as the
maintenance of all strategies in this fixed size space) the results also have bearing on the
conditions under which new strategies can enter the community.
Section 2 sets the notation and discusses some relationships between PRD and GRD. In
section 3 we identify conditions under which attractors of GRD can exhibit simultaneously
specialization and diversity, and characterize these attractors quantitatively. Section 4 sum-
marizes the results, discusses their possible significance and outlines some open questions.
Due to constraints on space, proofs for some of the results have not been included in this
paper. These and other generalizations of our results are the subject of a detailed follow-up
paper [8].
II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GRD AND PRD; INTERIOR EQUILIBRIA
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A. GRD preliminaries
Notation, definition of specialization and diversity
Let J denote the simplex of s-dimensional probability vectors:
J = {x = (x1, · · · , xs)
T ∈ Rs|
s∑
i=1
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0}. (2.1)
J is the full configuration space of PRD, and is invariant under it.
The configuration space of GRD will be denoted JN = ΠNα=1J
(α) where J (α) is a copy
of J for the αth agent. A point of JN will be denoted p = (p1,p2, . . . ,pN), where pα =
(pα1 , p
α
2 , . . . , p
α
s ) ∈ J
(α). JN is invariant under GRD, as the norm of every pα is preserved
under (1.1).
A point of JN at which every agent has specialized to some strategy or the other will
be referred to as a corner of JN , and at such a point we say that the community is ‘fully
specialized’. It is evident that a corner is an equilibrium point of (1.1) since p˙αi vanishes if p
α
i
does and (1.1) preserves norm, hence we often refer to a corner as a ‘corner equilibrium point’
or CEP. A CEP can be characterized by an s-vector of non-negative integers n = (n1, . . . , ns)
where ni is the number of agents pursuing the pure strategy i at the CEP, 1 ≤ i ≤ s (thus∑
i ni = N). Two CEPs with the same associated n vector are interchangeable, since they
differ only in the identity of the agents, irrelevant for our purposes.
The set Fk ≡ {p ∈ J
N |pαk = 0 ∀ α} for any k ∈ S is the subset of the boundary of J
N
where all agents have opted out of strategy k. At the ‘face’ Fk, strategy k becomes extinct
from the population and the full diversity of strategies is lost. The community will be said
to exhibit ‘diversity’ at all points that do not belong to some Fk. Note that we use the
word ‘diversity’ not to signify the variation between individual agents, but to indicate that
all strategies are supported. Indeed we can have no variation but full diversity if all agents
pursue the same mixed strategy: for all α, pα = c ∈ J◦. (The superscript ◦ for any set
denotes its relative interior.) When pα is independent of α, the community is completely
‘homogeneous’ since all agents are doing the same thing. The community can be fully
specialized and diversified at the same time: each agent chooses a pure strategy and every
strategy is chosen by some agent or the other. This corresponds to CEP with n such that
each ni is nonzero, which will be called a ‘fully diversified’ CEP or FDCEP. By contrast,
CEP where one or more strategies becomes extinct (some components of n are zero) will be
called non-FDCEP.
In this paper we are primarily interested in studying the circumstances in which FDCEP
are the preferred attractors of the dynamics, since in that case individual specialization and
global diversity will arise dynamically in the community.
Differences between PRD and GRD
If the initial point of a trajectory in GRD is homogeneous, the trajectory remains homoge-
neous for all time, and evolves according to (1.2) except that the time is speeded up by a
factor of N − 1. The sum x¯i ≡ (1/N)
∑N
α=1 p
α
i equals the probability that strategy i is being
played in the entire community, and is therefore the analogue of xi in PRD. We can ask how
x¯i evolves in GRD. It is easy to see that
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˙¯xi = N [x¯i
∑
j
aijx¯j −
∑
k,j
xikakjx¯j −
1
N
∑
j
xijaij +
1
N
∑
k,j
xikjakj ], (2.2)
where xik ≡ (1/N)
∑
α p
α
i p
α
k and xikj ≡ (1/N)
∑
α p
α
i p
α
kp
α
j . The r.h.s. of (2.2) is not propor-
tional to the r.h.s. of (1.2), except for homogeneous trajectories in which case xik = x¯ix¯k,
xikj = x¯ix¯kx¯j . Thus in general x¯i does not follow the PRD. One might have hoped that
when the number of agents N is large x¯i follows PRD, but even that is not the case due to
variation among the agents. For example, at the corner n, the difference between xik and
x¯ix¯k is ni(Nδij − nj)/N
2, which is comparable to the former two even for large N (except
for homogeneous corners).
One of our results in this paper is that even though variation among agents, which
is generic in GRD, causes the evolution of x¯i to be different from PRD, under suitable
conditions x¯i nevertheless converges to the interior equilibrium point of PRD.
B. The interior equilibria of GRD
Consider an interior equilibrium point (IEP) p of (1.1). By definition no pαi is zero in the
interior of JN . Therefore the bracket [ ] on the r.h.s. of (1.1) must vanish for all α, i. Define
xα0 ≡
∑
β 6=α
∑
i,j p
α
i aijp
β
j , and v
α
i ≡
∑
β 6=α p
β
i . Then
∑s
i=1 v
α
i = N − 1 ∀ α, and the interior
equilibrium condition can be written as
BXα = (N − 1)E0 ∀ α, (2.3)
where Xα ≡ (xα0 , v
α
1 , v
α
2 , . . . , v
α
s )
T , B is the s + 1-dimensional matrix
B =


0 1 1 · · · 1
−1
−1 A
...
−1


, (2.4)
and E0 is the s+ 1-dimensional unit vector (1, 0, 0, · · · , 0)
T .
It is not difficult to see (details in [8]) that (2.3) has an isolated solution if and only if
the following condition holds:
A1: ui 6= 0 ∀ i, and all ui have the same sign, where ui denotes the co-factor of B0i.
For the sake of notational simplicity, we have denoted the cofactor of B0i by ui instead
of u0i thereby suppressing the fixed first index. Under the above condition (A1) detB =∑s
i=1 ui 6= 0, and the solution is unique and given by v
α
i = (N − 1)xi ∀ α. Here,
xi = ui/detB (2.5)
is nothing but the ith coordinate of the unique isolated interior equilibrium point of PRD.
(Note thatA1 is also the necessary and sufficient condition for PRD to have an isolated IEP,
which, if it exists, is unique.) Since pαi − p
β
i = v
β
i − v
α
i = 0, it follows that the equilibrium
point is homogeneous and given by pαi = xi. Thus we have proved
Theorem 2.1 There exists at most one isolated equilibrium in the interior of JN . It exists
if and only if A1 is satisfied and then it is homogeneous (all agents pursue the same mixed
strategy), and coincides with the isolated interior equilibrium point of PRD, pαi = xi ∀ α, i.
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III. CORNER EQUILIBRIA OF GRD: DIVERSIFICATION WITH
SPECIALIZATION
A. Stability of corner equilibria
The IEP of GRD is always unstable to small perturbations. This is a consequence of the
following theorem proved in [1]:
Theorem 3.1 An equilibrium point of (1.1) is asymptotically stable if and only if it is
a strict Nash equilibrium. Further, any compact set in the relative interior of a face cannot
be asymptotically stable.
Note that strict Nash equilibria are perforce pure strategy Nash equilibria and therefore
correspond to CEP. As a consequence of this theorem, a trajectory either eternally moves
around in the relative interior of some face or the interior of JN coming arbitrarily close to
its boundaries and corners (the case of non-compact attractor), or it converges to a corner of
JN . It is possible to construct payoff matrices for which there are no asymptotically stable
corners in JN , whereupon the former situation obtains. However, our numerical work with
3 × 3 payoff matrices suggests that this happens rarely (i.e., in a relatively small region of
R3×3); for most payoff matrices asymptotically stable corners do exist for most values of
N . Further, we randomly generated ten 3 × 3 payoff matrices and numerically integrated
the GRD equations for long times for each payoff matrix with ten randomly chosen initial
conditions. When this was done with N = 5, in 90 out of the 100 cases the dynamics
converged to a corner. With N = 10, all 100 cases converged to a corner. This suggests
that typically, at large N , not only do asymptotically stable corners exist, but also that
their basins of attraction cover most of JN . Thus corners seem to be the most common
attractors in GRD. These are numerical indications and need to be made more precise. In
our interpretation of the model, a corner corresponds to a fully specialized community. The
above theorem and numerical evidence therefore suggest that specialization of all the agents
is the most common outcome in GRD.
At the CEP n, the payoff to an agent playing the jth pure strategy from the other N −1
agents is
Pj =
s∑
k 6=j
ajknk + (nj − 1)ajj =
s∑
k=1
ajknk − ajj = Pj − ajj , (3.1)
where Pj ≡
∑s
k=1 ajknk. If this agent were to suddenly switch to the i
th pure strategy (i 6= j),
all other agents remaining at their respective pure strategies, then for this agent the payoff
would change to
∑s
k 6=j aiknk−aij(nj−1) = Pi−aij . Thus the increase in payoff for an agent
playing the jth pure strategy at the FDCEP n (and this assumes nj 6= 0) in switching to
the ith pure strategy is
λij = Pi − Pj − hij , hij ≡ aij − ajj. (3.2)
Therefore, n is a strict Nash equilibrium if for every j such that nj 6= 0, the conditions
λij < 0 (3.3)
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are satisfied for all i 6= j. At a FDCEP, all nj are nonzero and this is a set of s(s − 1)
conditions. At a non-FDCEP where only s′ < s components of n are nonzero, the number
of conditions is smaller, s′(s− 1).
From Theorem 3.1, these are identical to the conditions for the asymptotic stability of
the FDCEP’s associated with n. In fact, one can show that λij given by (3.2) are precisely
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of (1.1) linearized around a corner of JN characterized
by n.
B. Stability of fully diversified corners
Theorem 3.2: Let PRD admit an isolated IEP x. That is, condition A1 holds [cf.
Section II]. Let n,n′ be any pair of asymptotically stable FDCEP’s of GRD with N ≥ s.
Then
(i) all components of the difference n′−n are bounded by a function of A alone, not of N ,
and
(ii) limN→∞
ni
N
= xi.
The proof is given in Appendix A.
The significance of this theorem is that it characterizes the FDCEP that are attractors
of the dynamics. If the community is going to end up in a fully specialized and diversified
configuration, the theorem quantifies the relative weights of all strategies that will obtain in
that configuration: these relative weights are forced to be ‘close’ to the IEP configuration
given by (2.5). The theorem does not guarantee the existence of a stable FDCEP. One can
prove the existence of an infinite set of values of N at which stable FDCEP are guaranteed
to exist under the conditions of the theorem. One can also identify sufficient conditions for
the existence of stable FDCEP for any N ≥ s. These are presented in [8].
C. Instability of non-fully diversified corners
We would like to define GRD as possessing diversity if all trajectories in the faces Fk
become unstable at some time or the other with respect to perturbations that take them away
from these faces. With this in mind we now study corners at which one or more strategies
become extinct and determine the conditions under which all such corners become unstable.
Then under small perturbations the population will dynamically flow out of such corners,
eliminating specialized configurations that do not carry the full diversity of strategies. As
remarked earlier, the number of conditions to be satisfied by a non-FDCEP to be stable is
less than the number to be satisfied by a FDCEP. Thus a priori, things seem to be loaded
against diversification. As we shall see, some further structure will need to be imposed on
A in order to make the non-FDCEP unstable. At this point we do not have the general
conditions for arbitrary s, but some insight gleaned from special cases s = 2, 3.
s = 2, N arbitrary
In this case conditions (3.3) can be studied exhaustively. There are generically four cases.
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Case 1: a11 > a21 and a22 > a12: Both (N, 0) and (0, N) are asymptotically stable, other
corners are not.
Case 2: a11 > a21 and a22 < a12: (N, 0) is the only asymptotically stable corner.
Case 3: a11 < a21 and a22 > a12: (0, N) is the only asymptotically stable corner.
Case 4: a11 < a21 and a22 < a12: The only asymptotically stable corners (n1, n2) (with
n1 + n2 = N) are those for which n1 6= 0, n2 6= 0, and furthermore,
(n2−1)
n1
h12 < h21 <
n2
(n1−1)
h12) if n2 < N − 1, and
(n2−1)
n1
h12 < h21 if n2 = N − 1.
Cases 2 and 3 correspond to dominated strategies. (The cases with one or more equalities
instead of inequalities have been disregarded as nongeneric. In any case, they are not difficult
to handle.) The case of interest to us is the last one, which shows diversification. It is
convenient to introduce the
Definition: A is diagonally subdominant if aii < aji ∀ j 6= i, {i, j} ⊂ S.
That is, hij > 0 ∀ i 6= j. From the above exhaustive list it follows that the condition
A2: A is diagonally subdominant,
is the necessary and sufficient condition for non-FDCEP to be unstable (for generic A). If
A2 is satisfied, the only asymptotically stable CEP are the FDCEP, for which Theorem 3.2
applies. (Note that for s = 2, A2 implies A1, the IEP is given by pα = 1
h12+h21
(h12, h21) for
all α, and the inequalities involving n in Case 4 above are equivalent to the statement that
(1/N)(n1, n2) must be close to this IEP for arbitrary N and converge to it as N →∞.)
Note that GRD remains invariant under addition of an arbitrary constant to any column
of the payoff matrix. Thus we may replace aij by hij, thus obtaining a matrix which under
A2 has zero diagonal elements and nonnegative off-diagonal elements. It is interesting that
these conditions also arise in PRD in the context of population genetics and ecological
models [9] as well as in models of catalytic networks of chemically reacting molecules [10].
s = 3, N arbitrary
For s = 3, A2 no longer implies A1; the latter is an independent condition. We now state
Theorem 3.3 For s = 3, if both A1 and A2 hold, then there exists a positive number N0
depending on A such that for all N > N0, all non-FDCEP are unstable.
The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix B.
We remark that while N0 is finite, it may, depending upon A, be much larger than three.
The above result can be further generalized (with the imposition of an additional condition)
to prove that for s = 3 all points in Fk are unstable for sufficiently large N [8]. Note that
our notion of diversity for GRD is related to the notions of ‘permanence’, ‘persistence’, etc.
introduced for PRD (see [2] and references therein). PRD is said to exhibit permanence if
every interior solution has components that remain bounded away from zero by a common
constant δ > 0. Strong persistence, in turn, is the weaker requirement where δ is trajectory
dependent and persistence the even weaker requirement that each component of an interior
trajectory not converge to zero. The biological implications are obvious: the concept is
clearly related to survival of species. The corresponding phenomenon here is the survival of
policies. The conditions for, e.g., permanence in PRD (see [2]) may quite generally play a
role in discussions of diversity in GRD.
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IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
To summarize:
(i) We have considered the equation (1.1) as a model of evolution of a community of
N agents, each agent being capable of performing any mix of a set of s strategies, and
modifying her mix depending upon the payoff received from other agents. We have studied
some properties of the attractors of this system to gain insight on how the community is
expected to evolve.
(ii) This model can exhibit specialization of the agents into pure strategies. Evidence
for this comes from the previously known Theorem 3.1, supported with our numerical ob-
servations. While individual specialization seems to be the most common outcome in this
model, it would be interesting to characterize more precisely the circumstances in which
specialization is guaranteed, i.e., when corners are the only attractors, and when not.
(iii) We have shown that under suitable conditions, while each agent specializes to a single
pure strategy, it is guaranteed that the community as a whole preserves the full diversity
of strategies. These are that the community be sufficiently large (N should be larger than
a number N0 that depends upon the payoff matrix), and the payoff matrix itself should
satisfy A1 (existence of an isolated interior equilibrium point) and A2 (diagonal entries
of A be smaller than other entries in the same column). These guarantee (for upto three
strategies) that all corners where one or more strategy becomes extinct are unstable to small
perturbations (Theorem 3.3). To identify sufficient conditions for larger s (and necessary
and sufficient conditions for s ≥ 3) is a task for the future. The appearance of a lower limit
on the size of the community in this context (which could be much larger than the number
of strategies) is interesting.
(iv) Within the set of configurations where the community would exhibit full specializa-
tion and diversity (the FDCEP), we have given a quantitative criterion as to which ones
will be the attractors (Theorem 3.2). ni/N (where ni is the number of agents pursuing the
pure strategy i at the attractor) is forced to be close to xi and equal to it in the large N
limit, where xi is given by (2.5) and is the relative weight of the i
th strategy at the interior
equilibrium point of PRD. This constraint is a consequence of the fine balance that exists
for every agent at a strict Nash equilibrium; any strategy switch for any agent reduces her
payoff. This fine tuning, caused by the interaction of the agent with other agents, is a kind
of organization exhibited by the system.
The conditions for the instability of non-FDCEP (Theorem 3.3) may also be relevant to
the question: when does a society accept an innovation? For consider a community of a
large number of agents but with only two strategies, 1 and 2, at a stable corner where n1
agents pursue the pure strategy 1 and n2 = N − n1 agents the pure strategy 2 (neither n1
nor n2 is zero). Since this corner is assumed stable, the 2 × 2 matrix A satisfies condition
A2 (diagonal subdominance). Now imagine that a new strategy 3 arises thereby enlarging
the payoff matrix to a 3×3 matrix A′ containing A as a 2×2 block. In the new context the
earlier state of the community will be described by a three vector n = (n1, n2, 0), which is in
the face F3. Now if the new payoff matrix satisfies A1,A2, and N is sufficiently large, then
from Theorem 3.3, this configuration is unstable with respect to perturbations in which one
of the agents begins to explore the new strategy. Thus if this agent were to explore the new
strategy ever so slightly, her payoff would increase and a small perturbation of the community
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would grow until it settles down in another attractor. The new attractor if described by
Theorem 3.2 would have the property that a finite fraction of the population pursues the
new strategy: the innovation has been accepted by the society. Thus the conditions A1,
A2 of Theorem 3.3 indicate what the payoffs of a new strategy (innovation) should be with
respect to the existing ones, if the innovation is to be guaranteed acceptance. (Conditions
that are both necessary and sufficient for diversity would considerably strengthen the above
remarks.)
It is worth mentioning that conditions A1, A2 are not equalities but inequalities. Thus
there is no fine tuning of parameters needed; the behaviour discussed above emerges when-
ever parameters cross certain thresholds.
It may be interesting to consider the ‘economic significance’ of conditions which play an
important role in preserving the full diversity of strategies. For example, diagonal subdomi-
nance, when translated as ‘each pure strategy gives more payoff to other pure strategies than
to itself’, carries a shade of an ‘altruism’ of sorts (at the level of strategies, not individuals).
Note that PRD with a payoff matrix in which diagonal entries are zero and offdiagonal ones
greater than or equal to zero is called a ‘catalytic network’ [2]. The general message might
be that if the initial set of allowed strategies is chosen with the ‘right vision’ (read ‘right
payoffs’), then, even a community of identical and selfish individuals, if large enough, will
exhibit diversity and accept only the ‘right’ innovations.
APPENDIX A
The proof of Theorem 3.2 in Section IIIB follows:
Proof: Note that Pi − Pj figures in both λij and λji. Therefore the s(s− 1) conditions
(3.3) can be written in terms of s(s− 1)/2 “double-sided” inequalities
− hji < Pi − Pj < hij . (4.1)
Define zi ≡ Pi − Pi+1 for i = 1, . . . , s, with Ps+1 ≡ P1. Then zi =
∑s
j=1 cijnj with cij ≡
aij − ai+1,j , where it is again understood that as+1,j ≡ a1j . Now, since all the nj are not
independent, let us express zi in terms of only n1, . . . , ns−1 by eliminating ns = N−(n1+· · ·+
ns−1). This gives zi = yi+ cisN where yi ≡
∑s−1
j=1 dijnj and dij ≡ cij − cis, i, j = 1, . . . , s− 1.
With this notation, consider the subset of s− 1 inequalities obtained by setting j = i+1 in
(4.1), with i = 1, . . . , s− 1. These involve zi and take the form
− hi+1,i − cisN < yi < hi,i+1 − cisN, i = 1, . . . , s− 1. (4.2)
These inequalities mean that for any stable FDCEP n, the yi, which are linear combinations
of n1, . . . , ns−1, are constrained to be in an open interval of the real line. While the location
of this interval is N dependent, it follows from (4.2) that the size of this interval is finite,
independent of N , and depends only on the payoff matrix (for yi the size of the interval is
hi+1,i + hi,i+1).
If the s−1 dimensional matrix D = (dij) has an inverse, we can invert yi ≡
∑s−1
j=1 dijnj to
express the nj in terms of yi. Then, (4.2) will get converted into inequalities for n1, . . . , ns−1.
Since the vector y˜ = (y1, . . . , ys−1) in the s−1 dimensional cartesian space whose axes are the
yi is constrained by (4.2) to lie in a (rectangular) parallelepiped, the vector n˜ = (n1, . . . , ns−1)
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in the s − 1 dimensional cartesian space whose axes are the ni will also lie in a (in general
oblique) parallelepiped which is the image, under D−1, of the rectangular parallelepiped
in y-space defined by (4.2). Again, while the location of the parallelepiped in n1, . . . , ns−1
space will depend upon N , its size, i.e., its extent along any of the coordinate axes, will be
independent of N . This is because the matrix D−1, if it exists, depends only on the payoff
matrix and not on N . Therefore, if D−1 exists, the differences in ni, i = 1, . . . , s − 1 for
all FDCEP are bounded by some function of A alone, not of N . The same is true for ns
also since
∑s
i=1 ni = N . One can show [8] that detD = detB. The existence of D
−1 is thus
guaranteed by condition A1, completing the proof of the first part of Theorem 3.2.
To prove the second part of Theorem 3.2, divide all sides of (4.1) by N and take the
limit N → ∞. This yields limN→∞[
Pi
N
−
Pj
N
] = 0. Defining x′i ≡ limN→∞(ni/N) along an
appropriate subsequence independent of i, this is equivalent to the statement that
∑s
k=1 aikx
′
k
is independent of i, which implies that x′ is the same as x, the IEP of PRD. ✷
APPENDIX B
The proof of Theorem 3.3 in Section IIIC follows:
Proof: Any non-FDCEP n must belong to some Fk, in this case to F1, F2 or F3. For
every i such that the component ni of n ∈ Fk is nonzero, consider the eigenvalue
λki = Pk − Pi − hki. (4.3)
From the discussion of Eq. (3.2) it follows that if any one (or the largest) of the λki at n
is greater than zero, then the CEP n is unstable against perturbations in which an agent
pursuing the pure strategy i moves towards strategy k (i.e., the perturbations which restore
the extinct strategy k will then grow).
For concreteness consider F3. Corners of F3 are of two types.
Case 1: Only one strategy survives at the corner. Then n = (N, 0, 0) or (0, N, 0). In the
former case (4.3) implies λ31 = (N − 1)h31 and in the latter case λ32 = (N − 1)h32. By A2
both corners are unstable.
Case 2: Both strategies 1 and 2 survive at the corner of F3. Then n = (n1, n2, 0) with both
n1 and n2 positive integers and n1 + n2 = N . There are then two eigenvalues from (4.3),
λ31 = h31n1 + h32n2 − h12n2 − h31, and λ32 = h31n1 + h32n2 − h21n1 − h32. Let us assume
that this corner is stable, hence both λ31, λ32 are negative. The condition λ31 < 0 (upon
eliminating n1 = N − n2) reduces to (h12 + h31 − h32)n2 > (N − 1)h31. Since n2, N − 1, h31
are all positive this means that the combination h12 + h31 − h32 is also positive, and
(N − 1)h31
h12 + h31 − h32
< n2. (4.4)
Similarly λ32 < 0 implies that h21 + h32 − h31 is positive (as can be seen by eliminating n2)
and further,
n2 <
(N − 1)(h21 − h31)
h21 + h32 − h31
+ 1. (4.5)
Combining the two, we get
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(N − 1)h31
h12 + h31 − h32
<
(N − 1)(h21 − h31)
h21 + h32 − h31
+ 1, (4.6)
which can be rearranged into the form
(N − 1)[−h21h12 + h21h32 + h31h12] < (h12 + h31 − h32)(h21 + h32 − h31). (4.7)
But the quantity in [ ] on the l.h.s. of this inequality is just u3 (as evaluated from the
definition given in A1), which is positive. (The positivity of detB and hence u1, u2, u3 also
follows from A1 and A2.) Thus we have
N <
(h12 + h31 − h32)(h21 + h32 − h31)
u3
+ 1. (4.8)
Note that the r.h.s. is a function of A alone and is finite, say N0(A). If N is chosen larger
than N0(A), this inequality is violated. That is, for N > N0(A), the corner of F3 under
consideration cannot be stable. We have thus proved that under A1,A2, all corners of F3
are unstable for N > N0(A). Similarly one may consider F1, F2, which will yield the same
result but with different finite bounds in place of N0(A). We can henceforth use N0 for the
largest of the three. The claim follows. ✷
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